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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ECOMOG: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AS A REGIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTION

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL IBRAHIMA MBAYE Senegal

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ii

ABSTRACT

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The fact that ECOMOG exists is a significant strength. Other than NATO, there are few coalitions or alliances of this type in the world. Strong influence-or some would suggest dominance- by Nigeria causes some of the weaknesses, as do the limited military capability and capacity, the lack of financial resources and adequate military and political structure. This paper will review the history of ECOMOG within its operational context, and analyze the weaknesses in order to suggest remedies.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	
LIST OF TABLES	VII
ECOMOG: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AS AREGIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTION)1
ECOMOG INTERVENTIONS	2
LIBERIA	2
SIERRA LEONE	4
GUINEA-BISSAU	5
NEW SECURITY MECHANISM FOR ECOMOG	7
WEAKNESSES OF ECOMOG	9
NIGERIAN DOMINATION	9
LIMITED MILITARY CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY	9
LACK OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES	10
LACK OF ADEQUATE POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUCTURE	11
CONCLUSION	
ENDNOTES	13
BIBLIOGRAPHY	15

νi

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF ECOWAS MEMBER STATES	7
TABLE 2 ECOMOG STAND-BY UNITS)

ECOMOG: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AS AREGIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTION

At the end of the eighty's, after the fall of the Berlin wall, Africa was no longer a strategic stake for the super powers. The confrontation between West and East that had taken place and allowed non-democratic and corrupt regimes to exist despite legitimate claims of their population, was over. More and more internal clashes began to appear in some African countries because the population, knowing that their regime was no longer supported abroad, demand more democracy, and more justice. Some governments did not see it in this way, and tried to keep ruling their countries as they had in the past. Then, with the proliferation of arms resulting, in part, from the fall of Soviet bloc, many civil wars occur in Africa. The international community, especially the Western countries, finding no vital interest in Africa and subject to a public opinion not ready to loose soldiers on this continent, hesitated to intervene. As a result, African countries were obliged to take charge of security issues in their subregion and continent.

In this context, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), whose first mission is economic integration, deployed in June 1990 in Liberia the first West African peacekeeping mission, ECOMOG (ECOWAS MONITORING GROUP) to halt the civil war. ECOWAS was concerned at the spread of instability in this region. It was the first time in Africa and even in the world a sub-regional organization initiated a peacekeeping mission in its areas.

Considered at its start as a non-efficient force, ten years later, ECOMOG became the main peacekeeping tool in West Africa. After Liberia, it was deployed in Sierra Leone and in Guinea-Bissau, and it is now ready to be deployed on the border between Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Even if the results of its different interventions are controversial, ECOMOG became a credible force, recognized by the UN, the USA, the EU, and the OAU. In addition, all the countries of ECOWAS (except for Cape Verde, which did not have significant armed forces) had participated at least in one of its different peacekeeping operations. The recognition by the international community, and the political willingness shown by the members of ECOWAS to use ECOMOG to maintain or restore peace within in its subregion demonstrate in fact the strengths of ECOMOG.

During the last ten years, ECOMOG had tried to improve its structure, its decision-making process, and its conduct in operations. However, still today, ECOMOG presents some weaknesses as a sub-regional security institution. Dominance by the giant Nigeria, limited military capability and capacity, lack of financial resources and the lack of adequate military and political structure managing and overseeing the ECOWAS field activities are some of the most significant weaknesses of ECOMOG.

This essay will review the history of ECOMOG interventions and the new mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security, and will analyze the weaknesses in order to suggest remedies for the future.

ECOMOG INTERVENTIONS

LIBERIA

In December 1989, Charles Taylor launched a rebellion against Liberian president Samuel Doe. It was the beginning of the civil war in Liberia between Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and Taylor's National Patriot Front of Liberia (NPLF). In few months, Taylor supported by some African states controlled 90% of the country. Soon others factions appeared: Prince Johnson, a former lieutenant of Taylor launched his own movement, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). In the north, the United liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) of Alhaii Kromah was founded. Although these factions fought among themselves, Taylor still occupied most of the country and seemed to be the most powerful. Meanwhile, thousands of people were killed, fled to neighboring countries or were displaced. ECOWAS leaders, horrified by this anarchy, tried to find a response to the Liberian conflict. However, ECOWAS, more concerned about economic issues, had not developed yet an elaborate security framework. The only security provisions were a protocol on Non-Aggression and a protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (applied to internal conflicts supported from outside and to aggressions against an ECOWAS member by a non ECOWAS country). However, the regional security and the humanitarian concerns prompted ECOWAS leaders to establish a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) made up of representatives from the Gambia, Mali. Nigeria and Togo. At the instigation of Nigeria, the SMC appealed for a cease-fire and decided on a military intervention: a peacekeeping force called ECOMOG. The decision to establish ECOMOG showed the tensions between Anglophone and Francophone countries.² Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, which supported Taylor, objected to the deployment, while Senegal, Mali, Togo, and Benin were exasperated by the manner in which the decision was taken. According to these countries, the SMC is not competent to intervene in internal conflict. ECOMOG did not have a clear mandate, or the agreement of the different factions. Nevertheless, the Anglophone countries decided to send forces. Initially, the ECOMOG forces consisted of some 4,000 troops from the Gambia (105), Sierra-Leone (350), Ghana (800), Guinea (500) and Nigeria (1,700). Guinea, the only Francophone that initially participated, was concerned about the thousands of refugees fleeing in its territory.3 The troop-contributors did not coordinate their logistical needs and capabilities prior to deployment. Each country had to

send its contingent to Freetown (Sierra-Leone), and later all the ECOMOG forces would travel to Monrovia by sea on Nigerian naval ships. Guinea and the Gambia were not able to ferry theirs troops, and at the end, Nigeria, to avoid delaying the deployment of the Forces, airlifted the Gambian and Guinean troops to Freetown. Nigeria tried to hide its dominant role by demanding that Ghana designate the Force Commander. In Liberia, while the others factions were waiting the arrival of ECOMOG. Charles Taylor claimed that Nigeria was committing an aggression and launched an attack to capture Monrovia (the capital). Then, when the ECOMOG forces landed in Monrovia in August 1990, the NPFL shelled the port, the beaches and sent troops to attack them. The ECOMOG repelled the NPFL with the assistance of the INPFL, and set up camp in Monrovia. This was the beginning of the escalation of ECOMOG fighting the NPLF, which had tried to capture the capital. At times, the peacekeeping force was fighting with the others factions against Taylor. Nigeria reinforced its troops and ECOMOG launched a fullscale offensive against the NPLF. Meanwhile, ECOWAS members tried to find a solution; the Francophone countries worked for a political solution and wanted the UN to be involved, Nigeria continued to seek a military solution, and wanted to keep the Liberia issue out of the UN so that it could exercise more control over ECOMOG.5

The USA became involved, and on the assumption that Taylor would cooperate with others troops, requested that Senegal participate with a significant contingent. The Senegalese participation, according to the United States, would show political consensus; in fact; it would break Nigerian domination, stop Taylor's complaints, and get the involvement of the Francophone countries in the ECOMOG process. In the field, while the ECOMOG forces controlled only Monrovia and its surroundings, the Senegalese troops were deployed in the interior in order to keep ULIMO and NPFL forces from clashing. Meanwhile, France was counseling Senegal to stay out of Liberia. However, as the US provided financial and logistical support, Senegal sent three battalions to Liberia.

Taylor did not respect his engagement and six Senegalese peacekeepers were killed by the NPFL. The Senegalese military high command developed an antipathy for the NPFL and accused Nigeria not sharing the burden of risk by assigning the Senegalese contingent alone into the interior. Nigeria responded by sending its aircraft to bomb all the territories held by NPLF, while the Senegalese contingent was getting ready to fight NPLF. This escalation was not the objective of the US. Senegal, no longer able to maintain the neutral role it had originally sought, withdrew its contingent.

In 1993, ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement signed by all factions to prepare for general elections in 1997. The UN subsequently became involved and established the United

Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to monitor and supervise the implementation of the peace agreement as well as obtain troops from African countries beyond ECOWAS to be involved in ECOMOG, in order to break Nigerian domination. Uganda and Tanzania sent troops but soon withdrew, arguing financial problem. In 1996, Nigeria began to face increasing domestic opposition to ECOMOG due to its high cost. Meanwhile, western countries began to increase their support for ECOMOG, making that force more credible. Contingents from Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Niger joined ECOMOG. ECOMOG supervised the implementation of the final cease-fire and oversaw the legislative and presidential elections in July 1997. Charles Taylor was the winner of these elections and at his request, a small contingent of ECOMOG remained in Liberia to consolidate the peace.

SIERRA LEONE

On 25 May 1997, in a military coup, the Armed Forces of Sierra-Leone overthrew Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the elected president. Major Johnny Paul Koroma who led the coup d'etat created the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group backed by Charles Taylor, joined him. The RUF had begun to fight the Sierra-Leonean Government in 1991. Nigeria had 900 troops in country when the coup d'etat occurred, as a consequence of its bilateral defense agreement with Sierra Leone. Nigeria responded to the coup by committing these troops to restore order and reinstate president Kabbah. Nigeria rapidly reinforced its troops, and smaller contingents from Guinea and Ghana were included to make the forces sub-regional. From the very beginning of its intervention, Nigeria was seeking to designate the operation as an ECOMOG action. The ECOWAS members met and refused to establish an ECOMOG force, claiming that the use of force was inappropriate. However, after unsuccessful negotiations with Koroma to restore the elected Government, the leaders of the member states decided on the establishment of an ECOMOG force. The mandate was, "to assist in creating the conducive atmosphere that would ensure the early reinstatement of the legitimate Government of Sierra-Leone."8 This mandate did not give Nigeria the full-scale military intervention that it hoped, and was a compromise between Nigeria and the Francophone countries opposed to armed intervention and fearful that ECOMOG would become an instrument of Nigeria domination. The efforts of the ECOWAS states to control the ECOMOG force were unsuccessful; Nigeria followed its own military strategy and financed much of the operation's cost. In February 1998, Nigeria launched an offensive and captured Freetown (the capital) and reinstalled the legitimate Government. The RUF and the AFRC forces retreated into the countryside and began guerrilla operations,

controlling several diamond mines. Due to the lack of appropriate counter-insurgency military equipment, and facing disciplinary problem among the troops, ECOMOG was not able to defeat the rebels. Faced with this situation, with more and more casualties and the cost of the intervention increasing, Nigeria threatened to withdraw from Sierra-Leone. At that time, the Western countries increased their support to ECOMOG and some ECOWAS states (Mali and Ghana) were able to reinforce the deployed units. The Sierra-Leonean government recreated new armed forces from former RUF rebels and AFRC soldiers, and sent them to fight alongside ECOMOG troops. However, during the combats these new Sierra-Leonean armed forces colluded with the RUF and AFRC and exposed ECOMOG forces. It became clear there was not going to be a military solution, and the ECOWAS member states initiated peace talk. A ceasefire and a political agreement in which the government and the rebels were to share power were established. Foday Sankoh became vice- president of the new Government. The UN supported this agreement and established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), ECOMG withdrew, and was replaced by 11,000 UN peacekeepers. Later in 2000, the situation in Sierra-Leone worsened when UN peacekeeping personnel were taken hostages by the RUF. The UN requested addition troops, and ECOMOG was again asked to intervene, Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal intend to send contingents after they will be trained and equipped by the USA.

GUINEA-BISSAU

In June 1998, president Joao Bernado Viera dismissed his Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Ansumane Mane. The General was accused of being involved in supplying arms to the Senegalese separatists of Casamance. Ninety percent of the Armed Forces rallied behind Mane in an attempt to oust President Viera. Immediately, Senegal and the Republic of Guinea intervened military in support of the President of Guinea-Bissau. Senegal sent about 2,000 troops, and the Republic of Guinea sent 400. The two countries explained their intervention in connection to a bilateral defense agreement with Guinea-Bissau, but in fact, Senegal was more concerned about the issue of Casamance and the Republic of Guinea by a possible influx of refugees. A Senegalese officer was designated as a Commander of the intervention troops as well as over the remaining Guinea-Bissau troops loyal to the president. While the Senegalese troops were fighting to capture Bissau (the capital), the Guinean troops were assigned to the protection of the second large city (Bafata). The Senegalese forces were correctly sustained and reinforced, on the other hand, the Guinean troops lacked logistical support. In this context, while the Senegalese troops captured the capital, the Guinean troops failed in the defense of

Bafata. The country became divided, the capital in the hands of Senegalese troops, the remaining of the country controlled by Ansoumane Mane's troops. The Government of Senegal had to deal with public opinion becoming increasingly hostile to the intervention due to its higher cost and mounting casualties, so it tried to transform the intervention into an ECOMOG operation. Although the ECOWAS states affirmed their support to Senegal and Guinea, they were not ready to establish an ECOMOG Force because they were concerned that any country would be able to use ECOMOG for its own purpose. Later, ECOWAS negotiated a cease-fire between Viera and Mane, with a peace agreement in which the Senegalese troops and the Guinean troops had to withdraw and new elections would be held. The withdrawal of the Senegalese and Guinean troops had to be done simultaneously with the deployment of new ECOMOG Forces. In February 1999, Senegalese and Guinean troops were replaced by a new ECOMOG Forces, strong of 600 troops from Togo, Benin, Niger and Gambia with a mandate of "monitoring the cease-fire and thereby facilitating the holding of elections". The Anglophone countries were absent from this mission excepted for the Gambia, which had a traditional relationship with Guinea-Bissau. Nigeria and Ghana did not get involved because their regional interests are found only in the English-speaking countries and this make the gap between Francophone and Anglophone countries all the more pronounced. The troops-contributing countries had no real experience in peacekeeping mission and are not known as countries with military traditions. ECOMOG Forces deployed in Guinea-Bissau with French assistance, which transported the troops, supplied a number of military trucks and provided per diem to the troops. 10 However, ECOMOG Forces were too small for its mandate and the troops lacked of logistical support and experience. The weakness of ECOMOG Forces encouraged Ansoumane Mane's troops to break the cease-fire agreement, launch an attack on Bissau, and oust President Viera. The mission of ECOMOG was compromised and the troop contributors decided to withdraw their contingent from Guinea-Bissau. It was the end of the ECOMOG operation in Guinea-Bissau

COUNTRY	OFFICIAL LANGUAGE	
Benin	French	
Burkina Faso	French	
Ivory Coast	French	
Cape Verde	Portuguese	
Gambia	English	

Ghana	English
Guinea	French
Guinea-Bissau	Portuguese
Liberia	English
Mali	French
Niger	French
Nigeria	English
Senegal	French
Sierra Leone	English
Togo	French

TABLE 1 OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF ECOWAS MEMBER STATES

NEW SECURITY MECHANISM FOR ECOMOG

Reviewing the experiences of the three ECOMOG interventions, and convinced that the development of insecurity and stability jeopardize the economic and social development of the sub-region, the heads of state of ECOWAS decided to establish a permanent peace and security framework. This security framework called "PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY" was signed in December 1999. The main objective of the mechanism is to "prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-state conflict". ¹¹ However, it also extends to the humanitarian relief missions and the Trans-border crime.

The main decision-making organ of the mechanism is the Mediation and Security Council. It is composed of nine Heads of State elected for two years. Its functions are to authorize military interventions, determine the mandate for the interventions, appoint the Special Representative and the Force Commander and inform the UN and OAU of its decisions. The Council is assisted by the Defense and Security Commission composed of Chiefs of Defense Staff or equivalent. The Commission advises the Council on the formulation of mandates, the composition of the contingents and the appointment of the force commanders. It also examines all technical, administrative and logistical requirements for peacekeeping operations. Council of Elders is made up of eminent persons chosen by the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, and can use the experience of the members to play the role of mediators, facilitators and conciliators. A Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense and Security is appointed, and will manage and oversee ECOWAS field activities. He is a General Officer and his mission includes implementing policy in ECOWAS military, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, as well

as training ECOMOG troops. To prevent conflict, ECOWAS established a sub-regional peace and security observation system. The system consists of an Observation and Monitoring Center located at the Secretariat, and four Observations and Monitoring Zones (the subregion is divided in four zones). This system should prevent conflicts by collecting and analyzing all day-to-day data that affect peace and security, environment, politics, and economics in the region.

Under the new mechanism, ECOMOG becomes the military forces of ECOWAS. It is permanent and is a structure composed of several stand-by units in their countries of origin, ready for immediate deployment. These stand-by units are trained, equipped and organized by ECOWAS through the office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense, and Security. The regional centers for training are in Ivory Coast and Ghana. The ECOMOG Force Commander reports to the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS or to the Special Representative of Executive Secretary if one is appointed. All contingent Commanders report to the Force Commander. To fund ECOMOG operations and the new mechanism, in addition to the contributions of the international community, ECOWAS states are taxed 0.5% on their imports from outside the subregion. The states contributing contingents are only financially responsible of their contingents for the first three months of any operation, after which ECOWAS takes on the responsibility. ECOWAS is also responsible for the organization of logistics including troop transport. For the first time also, ECOWAS allows remuneration for personnel involved in the field's activities.

COUNTRY	GROUND TROOPS	OTHERS
Benin	1 battalion	Police officers
Burkina Faso	1 battalion	
Cape Verde	-	
Gambia	1 company	
Ghana	2 battalions	
Guinea	1 battalion	
Guinea-Bissau	-	•
Liberia	1 battalion	
Mali	1 battalion	
Niger	1 battalion	
Nigeria	3 battalions	2 naval ships, 4 aircraft
Senegal	2 battalions	
Sierra Leone	-	-

Togo	1 battalion	
Ivory Coast	•	-

TABLE 2 ECOMOG STAND-BY UNITS

WEAKNESSES OF ECOMOG

The study of past ECOMOG interventions and the new mechanism show some weaknesses that need to be addressed.

NIGERIAN DOMINATION

Nigeria represents 51% of the population of ECOWAS, its GDP is 61% of the entire region, and its Armed Forces are twice as large as the Armed Forces of the others states. 12 Unquestionably, Nigeria is the giant in this region; it is the only regional power. In the past ECOMOG deployments, Nigeria provided the majority of ground forces as well as air and naval power. In the new mechanism for the stand-by units, the situation is similar. This domination by Nigeria, instead of being a driver for ECOMOG, sometimes disrupts its use. In fact, some countries (mostly the Francophone countries) think that Nigeria uses ECOMOG to further its own national interest, and that is why these countries hesitate before contributing troops. This idea is reinforced by the fact excepted during a short time in the beginning of Liberia intervention, all Force Commanders have been Nigerian and in absence of Special Representative of ECOWAS on the field, they have reported to the Nigerian Authorities. In the past, Senegal did not want to put its troops under Nigerian Command; and sent a contingent only at the request of the US. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria did not sent troops because it has no interest there; as a result, the ECOMOG mission failed because ECOMOG without Nigeria is not efficient. The fear of Nigerian hegemony was exacerbated by the fact that most of the ECOWAS states was under democratic civilian regime while Nigeria was under military rule at that time. The new security framework is established while Nigeria is under democratic rule. However, the new mechanism that makes the decision-making process more collective and provides more control on the forces in operation might make ECOMOG less attractive for Nigeria in the pursuit of its national interests, and it can opt not to participate. A democratic regime in Nigeria will strengthen ECOMOG.

LIMITED MILITARY CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY

Restoring peace in interstate conflicts in Africa where several factions are fighting with significant violence needs: trained, well-equipped and large numbers of troops. Past ECOMOG operations never fielded more than 8,000 troops and a significant air or naval power, so instead

of controlling the whole country, these forces just controlled the capital. The former ECOMOG Force Commander in Sierra Leone said that with sufficient helicopters he could have defeated the rebels. With the new mechanism, the stand-by units are less than 10,000 troops reinforced only by two naval ships and four bombers. It is still too weak as a force to enforce peace.

Few countries have logistics, and command and control capabilities. Among all the countries that have participated in ECOMOG operations, only Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana were able to sustain their contingent. They were also alone to execute command and control at brigade level.

Language, experience and origin are an issue for ECOMOG integration. The troops speak three different languages (French, English, and Portuguese). Some countries (Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana) have more peace operations experience, more military traditions and better-organized Armed Forces. The officer corps is very different from country to country; in some countries officers have received Western training, in others they have received Eastern training, in some cases they come from liberation wars or rebel movements and speak only the their local dialect.

LACK OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES

The lack of financial resources undermines ECOMOG actions. None of the countries, even the giant Nigeria, can sustain men, equipment and logistical requirements during long ECOMOG interventions. When the salary and per-diem are not regularly paid, the soldiers become poorly motivated and discipline problems occur. They become engaged in lucrative business rather than the military duties. ECOWAS by itself cannot financially support ECOMOG operations. Even if in the new mechanism find alternate means to fund ECOMOG activities, it is doubtful these will work, at a time when the arrears due by some countries come to US\$ 40 million (four times the ECOWAS annual budget) and when some keys personnel in the new security framework are not yet appointed because of lack of financial resources.

In fact, the real financial support remains the international community. However, to obtain the financial support from the international community takes time while ECOMOG deployment cannot wait .On the other hand, the international community will help only if its interests meet the ECOMOG actions; that is not always the case. One approach will be to use ECOMOG Forces as peacekeeping forces with a UN mandate so the financial aspect will be solved; it is this approach that has now been given priority in the case of Sierra-Leone. `

The lack of reconstruction, reintegration and development funds makes the restored peace insecure. Without disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs for child

soldiers, the conflicts will start again under new form or move to another state. The current conflict in Sierra-Leone, the current conflicts between Sierra-Leone, Liberia and Guinea are some good examples.

LACK OF ADEQUATE POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUCTURE

In past ECOMOG operations, a Special Representative of ECOWAS in the field such as during UN operations was never assigned. This person would be responsible for the political orientation of the mission, and would play a principal role. Even if the new mechanism provides for an appointment of this type, ECOWAS prefers to let the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense, and Security occupy this function, as seen in the deployment on the Guinean Liberian and Sierra-Leonean borders. As this person remains in the ECOWAS Secretariat, the Force Commander actually plays the political role. This situation can transform the mission, as it has in the past.

The military structure of ECOWAS is insignificant. Only one military officer is appointed, the General who is the Deputy Executive Secretary. His mission as defined by the new mechanism needs more military competencies, brought about by a larger and more robust staff.

Prior to the deployment of ECOMOG Force, ECOWAS needs a permanent military team to coordinate the logistical needs, determine the capability and capacity of each contingent, find solutions for the transportation and command and control problems. These responsibilities are currently given to the Force Commander who is usually appointed later; this situation can delay the deployment of the forces.

No military structure exists to manage and store the equipment given by the donors after ECOMOG campaigns end. Considering its lack of financial resources, ECOWAS cannot afford to lose this equipment and try to acquire replacements for future operations.

CONCLUSION

ECOMOG is a concrete manifestation of the desire of ECOWAS states to assume primary responsibility for promoting peace and security in the subregion. Although it can be seen as an unsatisfactory model of peacekeeping force, ECOMOG in Liberia has successfully protected the capital and saved some lives, in Sierra-Leone it has reinstated an elected regime, in Guinea-Bissau even it was not successful, the decision-making process was improved. ECOMOG also responded when the international community refused to be engaged in these conflicts. ECOMOG was created and fielded with unusual speed and effectiveness for an African organization. The large number of casualties suffered by ECOMOG would probably have caused another peacekeeping force to abandon the mission. The weaknesses noted earlier,

which include Nigerian domination, limited military capacity and capability, lack of financial resources and lack of military and political structure could be solved in the future as West African countries are becoming more involved in ECOWAS activities. The help of the international community and mainly Western countries, seeking to support regional organizations responsible for peace and security in their subregion, is also an essential element of success. The US training program ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative), the French program RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacites Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) and the British program BMATT (British Military Advisory and Training Team) are the best examples

Word Count = 4,506

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams. <u>Peacekeeping Africa: in Capabilities and Culpabilities</u> (Geneva: United Nations Publication, 2000), 84
 - ² Ibid., 88
 - ³ Ibid., 89
 - ⁴ Ibid., 92
 - ⁵ Ibid., 99
- ⁶Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan. <u>Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia</u> (New York: ST. Martin's Press, Inc, 1998), 127
- ⁷Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams. <u>Peacekeeping Africa: in Capabilities and Culpabilities</u> (Geneva: United Nations Publication, 2000), 103
 - ⁸ Ibid., 115
 - ⁹ Ibid., 128
 - ¹⁰ Ibid., 134
- ¹¹ECOWAS:" Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management Resolution Peacekeeping and Security,"October1998;< Available from http://www. Cedeao. Org/sitecedeao/francais meetrep-20072k.htm. Internet>. Accessed 27 November 2000
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